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COMMENTS
be regarded as guilty of conduct so anti-social in nature as to
preclude his taking final refuge behind a discharge in bankruptcy.
Therefore, it might be suggested that since the courts are
willing to individualize the various situations involving moral
conduct of the bankrupt, it would be appropriate to proceed in
this manner in the animal cases. The defendant, as in the prin-
cipal case, would be discharged in bankruptcy under this pro-
cedure if his act in keeping the dog was not for the purpose of
committing an intentional wrong or in reckless disregard of the
safety of others. The arbitrary rule of fixing liability based on
defendant's knowledge of a single prior attack by the animal
would be dispensed with.
CRAWFoRD H. DowNs
ACTION BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AGAINST UNTRUTHFUL ADVERTISING
SINCE 1940
As a part of a symposium in the George Washington Law
Review under the title "Unfair Competition and the Federal
Trade Commission,"1 Professor Milton Handler discussed twenty-
seven methods of competition which have been condemned as
violative of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
introduction traces the reaction of the courts toward the work
of the Commission from its inception in 1914 to the time of the
publication in 1940. Under various subsections, a resum6 of
the work of the Federal Trade Commission in preventing un-
truthful and misleading advertising is discussed and an array of
the cases set forth. As a supplement to this latter phase of the
above work, this study seeks to show subsequent developments
in the principles of what constitutes untruthful and misleading
advertising as applied by the Commission, and brings the cases
up to date, discussing in somewhat greater detail the application
of these principles to the factual situations involved.
Something of a requisite maturity seems to have been at-
tained in the work of the Federal Trade Commission. Progressing
from its earliest decisions in which only the grossest type of mis-
statements were forbidden as untruthful (which decisions only
too often were then set aside by the courts), the Commission is
1. Handler, Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission (1940)
29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399.
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finally on the way to the serious business of issuing orders against
the more subtle forms of false advertising. This progress is
attributed to a greater liberality on the part of the courts, new
legislation, and trial and error of the Commission in finding its
own way through the very chaos it was created to remedy. It is
in this twilight region between truth and falsity that the greatest
harm is done by untruthful advertising.
The Quality and Character of Goods
The Ford Motor Company advertised its so-called "six per-
cent plan" of refinancing automobiles manufactured by it. On
the face of the advertisement appeared the notation that the
plan did not call for six percent interest, but offered simply a
convenient multiplier which anyone could use and understand.
The Commission found that the opposite impression was intended
and created by the general purport of the advertisement.
In reviewing the cease and desist order,2 the court sustained
the finding of the Commission that the total impression likely
to be given was that the interest rate was six percent simple in-
terest on the unpaid balance, whereas six percent was actually
charged on the account originally financed from the date it began
to run until the account closed, and there were no computations
on the declining balances as the installments were paid; that
when the interest was thus calculated the rate would be ap-
proximately eleven and one-half percent; that the general pur-
port of the advertisement was misleading. The order to cease and
desist from the use of the word "six-percent" or the figure and
symbol "6%" in connection with the company's' refinance plan
was affirmed.
This was held to be sufficient ground to warrant the order
since the false advertising would tend to mislead the public into
buying at one price in the belief that it was purchasing at another.
The alleged good faith of the advertiser was disregarded. The
court refused to accede to the argument that the practice had
become so prevalent that those engaged in the trade were no
longer deceived," and it insisted that the advertisement must be
construed from the viewpoint of the prospective purchaser. Two
possible constructions were attributable to the advertisement.
2. Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 120 F.(2d) 175 (C.C.A.
6th, 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 668, 62 S.Ct. 130, 86 L.Ed. 535 (1941).
3. General Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F.(2d) 33 (C.C.A.
2d, 1940). An indistinguishable situation in which an identical order was
affirmed. In this opinion as well as in the principal case it was stated that
the practice had become prevalent throughout the trade.
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First was the impression that an addition of six percent to the
purchase price of the car would be made. Equally plausible was
the impression that ordinary interest at the rate of six percent
on the deferred installment payments would be required. This
uncertainty was regarded as being misleading.
In Benton Announcements, Incorporated v. Federal Trade
Commission,4 a cease and desist order issued against the use of
the words "engraved," "engraving," or "engraver's" to describe
the stationery of the petitioners or the process by which it was
made. The Commission defined engraving as the impression
made on paper by pressing upon it a metal plate into which
lines have been cut and ink applied. In the process describd
the ink is wiped from the plate and remains only in the lines.
To this plate the paper is applied, and the engraved effect is
the result.
Petitioners' method was accomplished by a secret process,
much cheaper than engraving as described by the Commission.
This process involves the engraving of a metal plate in the usual
way; but the text or design is printed upon paper with ordinary
type. The printed paper is then pressed upon the surfaces of
the uninked plate with sufficient force to cause an embossed
appearance. The Commission relied upon the testimony of those
familiar with the craft to the effect that the layman understands
the word "engraved" to mean the older process. Testimony of
those whose business carried them among the buyers of the prod-
uct was accepted in preference to the dictionary definition of the
term. It was conceded by the court that only an expert could
determine the difference between the two methods. But the
court said:
"people like to get what they think they are getting, and the
courts have steadfastly refused in this class of cases to demand
justification for their preferences; . . . but if the buyers wish
to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery."5
An interesting case illustrating the recent tendency of the
Commission toward insistence upon the most implicit truthful-
ness is Gimbel Brothers, Incorporated v. Federal Trade Commis-
4. 130 F.(2d) 254 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
5. Id. at 255. The origin of this doctrine was first announced in Federal
Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78, 54 S.Ct. 315, 320,
78 L.Ed. 655, 662 (1933): "the public is entitled to get what it chooses, ...
though the choice may be dictated by caprice of fashions or perhaps ignor-
ance." Accord: Federal Trade Commission v. Non-Plate Engraving Co., Inc.,
49 F.(2d) 766 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931); Floret Sales Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 100 F.(2d) 358 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
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sion6 Petitioners ran two newspaper advertisements of a job-
lot of fabrics for sale as "woolens." Most of these materials con-
tained part wool, and part cotton, rayon and other fabrics. The
Commission found that this representation had a tendency to
deceive the public. Its cease and desist order forbade the use
of the term except as to materials of one hundred percent wool
content, provided that when applied to material not wholly com-
posed of wool that words to be added describing each constitu-
ent fabric in the order of prominence by weight, or by percen-
tage of fiber when not present in substantial amounts by weight.
The court affirmed the first part of the order, but modified
the latter part by requiring merely that words of equal size and
conspicuousness be used to describe other materials. The basis
of this modification was the well known case of Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz.7 This decision was quoted:
"The gist of the complaint was that petitioners represented
mixed goods as all-wool; but there was no charge that the
petitioners had been selling mixed goods as such without
describing each constituent fiber in the order of its promi-
nence by weight, or specifying the percentage of the various
ingredients. An order to desist from sudh a practice goes be-
yond the complaint, and to that extent it is improvident."8
In view of the recent tendency of the courts to refrain from
undue interference with the work of the Commission and dicta
contained in the opinion it appears that equitable and practical
considerations of the difficulty of carrying out the Commission's
decree may have been the moving factors in prompting the court
to modify the order. It pointed out that compliance with the
order by petitioner would require a chemical analysis of each
piece of fabric, since the products constituted a job-lot of odds
and ends without any uniformity of constituent fibers. Reference
6. 116 F.(2d) 578 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
7. 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572, 64 L.Ed. 993 (1920).
8. Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 116 F.(2d) 578, 579
(C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
9. Alberty v. Federal Trade Commission, 118 F. (2d) 669 (C.C.A. 9th,
1941). The Commission restrained the claim that preparations called Alberty's
Food Regular and Alberty's Food Instant rendered milk more readily diges-
tible, constituted competent remedies, cures or treatments for cancer or
ulcer, or had any remedial or therapeutic or medical value. Petitioner com-
plained that testimony of medical experts representing one school of thought
had been accepted to the exclusion of those of another which was equally
recognized under the law. The court indicated that experts who were, and
who were not, adherents of the homeopathic school of medicine were allowed
to testify and having given conflicting testimony it was stated that "Con-
flicts in testimony are for the Commission, not this court to resolve."
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was also made to the fact that on a prior occasion when a com-
plaint of untruthful advertising was brought before the Commis-
sion, it expressly found that a competitor "truthfully represent-
ed" similar merchandise as "mixtures of wool and rayon." Apart
from the above considerations there may have been no serious
intention to reassert the doctrine of the Gratz case.
To the petitioners' contention that a single incident of mis-
representation could not constitute a violation of the statutory
prohibition against untruthful advertising the court replied that
innocence of deception is no defense since the purpose of the
statute is protection of the public-not punishment of the wrong-
doer.'0 A deliberate effort to deceive is not necessary to bring
acts within the prohibition of the statute.1
In another case 2 a cease and desist order was issued against
the use of the term "Olive Oil" denominatively on a soap which
had only a fifteen percent olive oil content. Various other deno-
tations of the word, olive, which had been used by petitioners
to designate their brands of soap were included in the order. It
included the brand "Palm and Olive Oil," and was based on a
finding that the use of the brand would lead the public to believe
that it was one hundred percent olive oil soap. The order directed
that if this designation be used on soap whose oil or fat content
was not wcholly olive oil an explanation must be included. This
should identify each constituent oil successively in the order of
its predominance by volume. If any particular oil in the soap
was not present in an amount sufficient to affect substantially its
detergent qualities, then the percentage must be specifically dis-
closed. In setting aside this latter part of the order the court
held that the petitioner could not be compelled to detail the con-
stituency of the soap; that an appropriate legend eliminating the
probability of deception resulting from the use of the name was
sufficient.
10. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27, 50 S.Ct. 1, 3,
74 L. Ed. 138, 145 (1929): "to justify the commission in filing a complaint
... the purpose must be protection of the public. The protection thereby
afforded to private persons is the incident. Public interest may exist although
the practice deemed unfair does not violate any private right." Accord:
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 281 Fed. 744, 752
(C.C.A. 6th, 1922).
11. Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 79,
54 S.Ct. 315, 321, 78 L.Ed. 655, 664 (1934): "Competition may be unfair within
the meaning of this statute and within the discretionary powers conferred
on the commission, though the practice condemned does not amount to fraud
as understood in courts of law." Accord: Federal Trade Commission v.
Blame, 23 F.(2d) 615, 621 (C.C.A. 2d, 1928).




Judge Treanor, in his dissenting opinion, insisted that the
petitioners were in a better position to have special knowledge
of the reaction of the purchasing public to the trade name or
brands which identified their soaps. Upon this consideration
alone the view was expressed that the Commission's order was
warranted by the facts and that the provisions of the order went
no further than was necessary for the protection of the public.
In view of the basis of this dissent, as well as the fact that
in both this and the Gimbel case1 the court was of the opinion
that the order was highly impractical and unduly burdensome,
it is doubtful that if the issue were directly presented in a case
free of these objections, the court would nevertheless burden
the Commission with the procedural requirement that the find-
ings of fact and the order be confined to the issues raised in the
complaint.14
Many shibboleths concerning the courts' powers to review
orders issued by the Commission which formerly were used
freely now appear to be brought into play only on occasions
where the courts feel that the action of the Commission has whol-
ly transgressed all bounds of propriety. An excellent illustra-
tion is afforded by Kidder Oil Company v. Federal Trade Com-
mission.15 The order forbade petitioner from making certain rep-
resentations concerning Kostal, a lubricating oil treated with
graphite. The petitioner had advertised that his product (1)
penetrates and adheres to all metal surfaces and soaks into the
metal. It further stated (2) that an automobile lubricated with
Kostal will run a greater distance without oil in the crankcase,
and (3) that the lubricating qualities of its product are greater
than the lubricating oil contained in it. These representations
were forbidden by the Commission. The court affirmed the order
insofar as the prohibited claims were represented as applicable
to full-film conditions (conditions under an adequate supply of
oil). But it set aside the order as applied to boundary conditions
(those that obtain when the oil supply is low). However, the
latter condition was the one toward which the petitioner's adver-
tisements were primarily directed, so the part of the order left
intact was wholly ineffectual.
The trial examiner's report was at variance with the Com-
mission's findings of fact. This report was not made a part of
13. 116 F.(2d) 578 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
14. Cf. Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 143 F.(2d) 676, 678 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944), where the issue was raised col-
laterally.
15. 117 F.(2d) 892 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941).
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the transcript certified by the Commission. In failing to certify
the report the Commission relied upon Rule 13 which provides,
in effect, that the trial examiner's report upon the evidence is
not a decision, finding, or ruling of the Commission; that it is
not a part of the formal record of the proceedings, and is not to
be included in the transcript of the record. The court held that
Rule 13 was in conflict with the statute requiring that the entire
record of the proceedings be certified by the Commission, and
was therefore invalid. A copy of the report was sent to the
petitioner so that he could file objections to it, hence the court
concluded that it thereby became a part of the record, and the
court had at least the discretionary right to require that it be
included to determine if the findings were supported by substan-
tial evidence. It follows that the court reviewed the evidence in
the light of the reports, although it disavowed that it was so
doing. It found that part of the findings upon which the order
was based was insufficient. The following quotation from the
opinion is noteworthy in this connection:
"We recognize that our province is not to weigh the testi-
mony, but we think it is not inappropriate to briefly refer
to some of the direct positive testimony which contradicts
many of the uncertain statements made by witnesses relied
upon by the commission, and the inferences indulged in by
such witnesses."' 6
The court seemed to manifest a regression to a former policy
of recognizing the advertiser's time-honored claim to the right
to "puff." With reference to the petitioner's claim that its prod-
uct was a perfect lubricant the court stated:
"We can conceive of situations where the use of such words
might be deceptive and even fraudulent. As used by peti-
tioner, however, we are of the opinion that they are nothing
more than a form of 'puffing' not calculated to deceive."'17
The court refused to make an additional finding of fact and held
that, assuming the authority to make such a finding exists, it
should be exercised only when the findings by the Commission
are insufficient to dispose of the issues presented. In ordinary
cases where the petitioner is plainly mis-stating the quality or
character of his goods the court readily affirms the order. 8
16. Kidder-Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 117 F.(2d) 892, 899
(C.C.A. 7th, 1941).
17. Id. at 901.
18. 142 F.(2d) 577 (C.C.A. 5th, 1944).
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Origin of Products
Where goods of a particular geographical locality have ac-
quired a reputation of exceptional quality, the misuse of such
locality as a trade name is an untruthful and deceptive practice
within the meaning of the statute. The Commission requires
that names indicating source of origin of goods be accurately
used, principally for the protection of the public, rather than com-
petitors. Those doing business at places other than the place
whose name appears on their goods are not permitted to use such
geographical name merely for the purpose of false representa-
tion.19
A Pennsylvania manufacturer of cigars, which contained
only Pennsylvania tobacco but were branded "Havana Smokers,"
was ordered to cease and desist from using the word Havana to
designate its product.2 0 The petitioner requested the privilege of
retaining the word "Havana" with an appropriate legend indi-
cating the domestic source of the tobacco content. In refusing
this request the court stated that the implication in the word
"Havana" was totally false; that the purchaser could be guided
either by the label or the legend, but not both.
The recent tendency of the courts to modify orders of the
Commission prohibiting the use of deceptive brands and names
by allowing continued use of explanatory legends will apparently
not be extended to cases where the implications of the name are
wholly false.2 1 In 1867 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
19. Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (3 ed. 1936) 298-299, § 105.
20. H. N. Heusner & Son v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 F.(2d) 596
(C.C.A. 3d, 1939).
21. Federal Trade Commission v. Army & Navy Trading Co., 66 App.
D.C. 394, 400, 88 F.(2d) 776, 780 (1937). This identical circumstance was
presented to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. After a care-
ful review of the authorities the court concluded: "But the phrase 'Army
and Navy Trading Company' makes the single representation that at least
the major portion of the merchandise offered for sale is in some sense Army
and Navy Goods. This single representation being untrue, it cannot be quali-
fied; it can only be contradicted. The cases . . . justify the qualification ...
where qualification is possible; they do not justify contradiction."
A case in accord is El Moro Cigar Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
107 F.(2d) 492 (C.C.A. 4th, 1939), where the Commission issued an order for-
bidding the advertising of cigars made entirely of domestic tobacco as
"Havana Counts" on the ground that the testimony -before the Commission
showed that the word "Havana" had acquired a special meaning or signifi-
cance when applied to cigars-that it had come to mean that at least a
portion of the tobacco was grown in Cuba and was known for its very fine
quality. The petitioner insisted that its use of the name in advertising for
thirty-three years-seventeen years after the establishment of the Commis-
sion-established for it a privilege resting in property with which the Commis-
sion had no right to interfere. The court took the position that this was no
defense to an implication which was totally false; that time did not create
an estoppel since the Commission acted on behalf of the community at large;
COMMENTS
Palmer v. Harris2 2 was the first tribunal to announce the doc-
trine followed in the principal case. It described the practice as
"a falsehood as to the place where goods are manufactured, in
order to have the benefit of the reputation which such goods have
acquired in the market. 2' The Federal Trade Commission has
followed this early doctrine in giving the public affirmative pro-.
tection from misrepresentation as to the origin of products.24
Since this brand had been used and advertised since 1902-
thirty-seven years-the petitioner insisted on the right to retain
the name, Havana, with the legend, on the basis of the secondary
meaning acquired. Invoking a rough analogy to the unclean
hands doctrine as applied in unfair competition suits, the court
refused to permit permanent user of a name which was untruth-
ful in its inception. Such a practice, it declared, would permit
the petitioner to profit by his own wrongdoing. However, in
other cases the rigidity of this position has been tempered in the
interest of the public by taking into account the confusion likely
to result from sudden elimination of a name which has acquired
a secondary meaning in connection with a particular product.2 5
Accordingly, the order was so modified to allow a period of two
years within which to discontinue the use of the brand "Havana."
In Establissments Rigaud, Incorporated v. Federal Trade
Commission,26 the petitioners were using French names denomi-
natively upon their perfumes. A part of the constituent elements
were imported from France, but others were of American origin.
The Commission issued a cease and desist order against the use
of the term "Paris" or "Paris France" without an accompanying
legend that the perfumes were not wholly of French origin and
that there was no bar to a proceeding in the public interest. Seemingly,
the same reason was present in the Heusner case for which the court modi-
fied the order allowing two years for discontinuance of the prohibited brand.
22. 60 Pa. 156 (1867). Accord: Solis Cigar Co. v. Pozo, 16 Colo. 388, 26
Pac. 556 (1891).
23. 60 Pa. 156, 160 (1867).
24. Federal Trade Commission v. Winstead Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483,
42 S.Ct. 384, 66 L.Ed. 729 (1922) ("natural wool" for cotton); Federal Trade
Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 S.Ct. 315, 78 L.Ed. 655(1935) ("California white pine" for yellow pine); Proctor & Gamble v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 11 F.(2d) 47 (C.C.A. 6th, 1926) ("Naphtha soap" with-
out naphtha); Federal Trade Commission v. Bradley, 31 F. (2d) 569 (C.C.A.
2d, 1929) ("English tub soap" made in America); Lighthouse Rug Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 35 F.(2d) 163 (C.C.A. 7th, 1929).
25. Masland Duraleather Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 34 F.(2d)
733 (C.C.A. 3d, 1929), where petitioners described their imitation products
as "Duraleather." They were given six months to adopt some other accept-
able trade name that would not be misleading, yet would retain the benefit
of their good will.
26. 125 F.(2d) 590 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
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that they were compounded in the United States. The order con-
tained a general prohibition against the use of French words as
brand names for perfumes without similar inscriptions following,
and without English translations. The order was based on a find-
ing of fact that purchasers prefer perfumes of French origin, and
such names would lead them to believe that the perfumes them-
selves-not merely the ingredients-were of French origin. Re-
garding the order as too broad, the circuit court of appeals elimi-
nated the requirement that English translations must accompany
French names. The court justified its position by stating that in
its opinion French names are prevalently applied to domestic
perfumes, and that the fact of their having been packed in Amer-
ica is of too small a consequence to burden the petitioners with
so indicating. The court mildly rebuked the Commission for
taking cognizance of a matter of such trifling consequence. How-
ever, it affirmed the order as modified on the ground of the broad
discretion given the Commission by the statute.
In Grand Rapids Furniture Company, Incorporated v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission27 the court sustained an order of the Com-
mission forbidding manufacturers of furniture from using "Grand
Rapids" as a part of their corporate name, or from so designating
furniture not in fact manufactured in Grand Rapids, Michigan,
or from otherwise misrepresenting the place of origin of their
furniture. There was substantial evidence found to support the
order.
Status of the Manufacturer or Producer
In Educators Association, Incorporated v. Federal Trade
Commission2s petitioners were persons who could not qualify as
teachers or educators. Nevertheless they published an encyclo-
pedia, "The Volume Library," suitable for school children.
Through their agents they had repeatedly represented to parents
that this was required material of the school patronized by such
parents, and that it was published by an association of educators
whose objective was to further the cause of education, on a non-
profit basis. The order forbade deceptive advertising through the
use of the name "Educators Association," and forbade the repre-
sentation that this was a required text of any school. The court
modified the order by allowing the use of the name, provided it
was coupled with an appropriate expression revealing the char-
acter of the publisher's business, which would counteract the
27. 134 F.(2d) 332 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943).
28. 108 F.(2d) 470 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939).
[Vol. VI
COMMENTS
false impression otherwise implicit. The court held that prior dis-
continuance of the false advertising was no defense to the Com-
mission's order since the statute gave the Commission authority
to issue a cease and desist order against anyone who "'has been
or is using any unfair . . . or deceptive act or practice in com-
merce.' " 29
Subsequent to this decision the Commission and the peti-
tioners failed to agree upon what explanatory phrase or expres-
sion should be added to the name "Educators Association." Upon
a second appeal, 0 the court made its own modification of the
decree by requiring that the words "Commercial Publishers of
the Volume Library" be used in connection with the corporate
name. One judge dissented on the grounds that these words
were misleading and inadequate, that some expression such as
"a private commercial enterprise" should be added.
In Mancher v. Federal Trade Commission"1 petitioners ap-
pealed for a modification of an order requiring them to cease
representations that they were wholesalers and jobbers of jew-
elry with fifty years of continuous business experience. The pe-
titioners sought to have the order modified by adding- "when
such is not the fact." In refusing this modification the court
pointed out that if the petitioners were to change their business
status and become wholesalers or jobbers this particular part of
the order would no longer be applicable, and that they could not
truthfully claim continuity of business despite intermediate bank-
ruptcies. The court expressed the following reasons for the re-
fusal:
"An order must therefore issue; and we are not disposed to
make amendations in the one framed by the commission in
order possibly to soften the blow, but more probably to breed
trouble by creating new ambiguities or at least illusory hopes
in the petitioners' minds."'22
In Lane v. Federal Trade Commission22 it was shown that
the petitioner had been issuing pamphlets which purported to
contain the conclusions of a testing bureau for the purpose of
determining the relative utility of various consumer goods. He
was ordered by the Commission to cease representing that his
pamphlet was published on a non-profit basis, or that he or any
29. Id. at 473.
30. Educators Association, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 108 F.(2d)
470 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939).
31. 126 F.(2d) 420 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
32. Ibid.
33. 130 F.(2d) 48 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942).
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of his staff possessed the requisite qualifications for making scien-
tific tests of products, and from representing that he was affili-
ated with Nelson Institute, the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, or any similar organization. The petitioner complained
that the order was too broad in that it prevented his ever en-
gaging in any legitimate business of this kind whatsoever. The
court took the position that the Commission was not under the
circumstances compelled to assume that the petitioner would
ever engage in a legitimate enterprise.
Illustrative of the courts' tendency to affirm orders of the
Commission founded upon very close factual considerations is the
recent case of Herzfeld v. Federal Trade Commission 4 Petitioners
were ordered to desist from using "Mills" as a part of their title
or otherwise indicating that they were manufacturers, thereby
deceiving dealers and purchasers of their rugs into believing that
no middleman's profit was involved; also enabling dealers to rep-
resent to consumers that petitioners were manufacturers. "Ste-
phen Ray Mills," accompanied by a legend in substantially small-
er letters "Importers and Wholesalers of Floor Coverings," was
the title used. They controlled the fabrication of the rugs-gave
all specifications for their construction, were the landlords of
the manufacturers, and held a mortgage on most of the ma-
chinery. A poll conducted by the Commission revealed that over
one-half of the dealers preferred to buy from manufacturers,
and more than one-fifth of them thought that such was the status
of the petitioners. No deception of the ultimate consumer was
found, but the court relied on the established doctrine that none
is necessary where there is a fair probability that such would be
the ultimate effect.8' Furthermore, the fact that the petitioner
would be once removed from any such deception did not prevent
his being considered a party to it. The court considered how far
the probabilities of deception outweighed the inconvenience to
the petitioner by compelling him to change his title, and it con-
cluded that the exercise of discretion on this matter properly
comes within the province of the Commission and had been
properly exercised in this instance.
Therapeutic or Medicinal Value
Cases involving representations concerning therapeutic or
inedicinal value are by far the most prevalent with which the
34. 140 F.(2d) 207 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
35. Federal Trade Commission v. Winstead Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483,
42 S.Ct. 384, 66 L.Ed. 729 (1922).
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Commission must deal. The importance of a careful and sound
administration here can hardly be overemphasized. The victim
seeking relief from pain makes this an unusually profitable field
for the unscrupulous. Moreover, the extensive harm which may
follow the use of deceptive advertising in connection with drugs
requires the exercise of great care by the Commission. Adver-
tisements of "medical" compounds which fail to acquaint the
purchaser with possible dangers from their use are readily made
the object of desist orders. Furthermore the action of the Com-
mission in that type of case usually finds a ready affirmance by
the courts.
The makers of a flesh-reducing compound which was sold
under the name of "Re-Duce-Oids" were ordered by the Commis-
sion to cease and desist from advertising this product without
disclosing its harmful potentialities. The preparation was recom-
mended as a safe, competent and effective remedy or cure for
obesity. According to the findings of the Commission it was
neither safe nor effective, and should be used only under com-
petent medical supervision. The defense offered was that the
Commission was without authority to compel the petitioner to
disclose facts with respect to the consequences which might result
from the use of its product. To this defense the following ex-
cerpt from the opinion aptly illustrates the attitude taken by the
court:
"The order does not require petitioners to reveal anything.
It requires them to cease and desist from disseminating false
advertisements . ..but does not require them to advertise
at all. If petitioners do not choose to advertise truthfully,
they may, and should, discontinue advertising."3 7
Another prevalent type of false and misleading advertising
with which the Commission is frequently confronted is one which
involves no particular danger to the purchaser; its objection lies
in the fact that advertisers are thereby enabled to pawn off a
worthless product on the public. An example of the all-too-preva-
lent practice is afforded in the case of Seborne Company v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission.8 The petitioners were ordered to cease
and desist from representing in their advertisements that their
products were remedies or cures for dandruff, that they would
F(36. American Medicinal Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 136
F.(2d) 426 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943).
37. Id. at 427.
38. 135 F.(2d) 676 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
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remove the causes of odors, or that they were the results of new
scientific discoveries. These representations were found by the
Commission to be gross exaggerations which were both mislead-
ing and untruthful. Several defenses were interposed. First, the
petitioners insisted that the representations were so awkward
and exaggerated that they could not be effective as instruments
of deception. Second, it was claimed that an advertisement which
promises "relief" does not by the dictionary amount to a holding
forth of an assurance of permanent cure. Finally, it was urged
that all the petitioners were not parties to the questionable prac-
tice. The court properly held that a unity of action would be
inferred in a joint enterprise. It further noted that the petition-
ers could not successfully contend that the public understood
that continued application was necessary despite petitioners' rep-
resentations that "'Most users of Seborne report their dandruff
gone in one week or less.' "39 The petitioners' insistence upon a
literal construction of its advertisements was readily dismissed.
The court declared that it would look to the spirit rather than
the letter of the representations: "Words and sentences may be
literally and technically true and yet. be framed in such a setting
as to mislead or deceive. ' 4 The Commission's findings and its
order were sustained by the courts in all respects.
A recent case involving the false advertisement of drugs of-
fers an illustration of the growing inclination of the courts to
allow considerable latitude to the Commission in determining the
weight of conflicting testimony. In John J. Fulton Company v.
Federal Trade Commission41 an order was issued against repre-
senting that "Uvursin," a compound of herbs, was an effective
treatment for diabetes. The Commission received the testimony
of physicians summoned by the petitioner who testified that dia-
betic patients had sometimes improved while taking the nostrum.
This testimony was discounted on the ground that the treat-
ments referred to were not administered under scientifically con-
trolled conditions. On the other hand the statements of experts
summoned by the Commission were accepted on the basis of their
expert pharmacological knowledge, although these persons had
never administered the drug. Admissibility of' this latter type
of testimony had been previously approved by the court in Justin
39. Id. at 679.
40. Bockenstette v. Federal Trade Commission, 134 F.(2d) 369, 371 (C.C.A.
10th, 1943).
41. 130 F.(2d) 85 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 679, 63 S.Ct
158, 87 L.Ed. 544 (1942).
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Hynes & Company v. Federal Trade Commission.4 2 The order
was unanimously affirmed in the principal case.
Claims of therapeutic value of mineral waters received the
attention of the Commission and the court in Carbon Water Com-
pany v. Federal Trade Commission.-" Mineral water was adver-
tised as effecting a therapeutic cure for fifty-two named diseases,
ranging from neuritis to chronic pneumonia and from poison ivy
to sterility. Not content with these modest claims, the advertiser
insinuated that the potentialities of the nostrum remained yet
to be discovered. The only requirement of the Commission's
order was that the petitioners confine their statements to the
claims of their own physician experts-that the water would,
when used internally and externally, cure these fifty-two dis-
eases. These physicians appeared to have gained some of their
clinical experience with Carbon Springs water by administering
it to their dogs and wives. The court pointed out that according
to their testimony, a therapeutic dose of lithium (the mineral for
which it was advertised) would require the drinking of from
one hundred and fifty to two hundred and twenty-five thousand
gallons of the advertised nostrum within a period of twenty-four
hours. It pointed out that Potomac River water contains five
times as much lithium per gallon as the miracle water of Carbon
Springs.
The cease and desist order issued in Philip R. Park, Incor-
porated v. Federal Trade Commission44 was directed against the
advertising of "Parkelp Tablets" as possessing sufficient quanti-
ties of enumerated minerals to be of therapeutic value. This order
was directed against advertisements disseminated four years
before the investigation and five years before the order, and ap-
proximately two years before the law defining false advertising
became effective, March 21, 1938. The court unanimously affirmed
the order.
In Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission" the objection-
able advertising practice related to medical preparations for re-
lief of delayed menstruation known as "Triple-X Compound,"
"Perio Pills," and "Perio Relief Compound." These were adver-
tised as being effective, harmless remedies for "delay," and it was
claimed that they would bring immediate "relief" painlessly.
Literally construed the advertisements stated that the prepara-
42. 105 F.(2d) 988, 989 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 616, 60
S.Ct. 261, 84 L.Ed. 515 (1939).
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(d) (1914).
44. 136 F.(2d) 428 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943).
45. 132 F.(2d) 165 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942).
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tions were for "functional delays" and "unnaturally suppressed
periods." The implication to be gained from the statements, how-
ever, was that the preparations could be safely used to produce
abortions. Such statements as the following were used: "A new
discovery-Triple-X Relief compound is the fastest acting, safest
aid to married women."40
The Commission found that to the purchasing public "relief"
meant a remedy or cure; that in reality there was no one cure
for all the difficulties for which the compounds were recom-
mended. The Commission also found that the medicine contained
chemicals which were dangerous and that no notice of this was
afforded by the advertisements used. Furthermore there was an
implied assurance that no limitation of dosage need be observed.
The substance advertised was particularly dangerous when taken
during pregnancy, and produced abortive tendencies. The order
directed the petitioner to desist from advertising his preparations
so as to state, directly or by implication, that they were an effec-
tive remedy, or that they were harmless or safe to use. It also
required that the advertiser give affirmative notice that his prod-
uct might produce gastric or intestinal disturbance, and, during
pregnancy, violent poisonous effects. In affirming the order the
court correctly concluded that the world "relief" as used in the
entire context of the advertisement would imply that a remedy
or cure was offered and hence that the advertisement was un-
truthful. It pointed out that the ultimate impression upon the
reader arises from the sum total of not only what is said but also
of all that is reasonably implied, and that advertisements must be
read in their entirety and as they would be understood by those
to whom they appeal. The court relied upon an axiom set forth
in Florence Manufacturing Company v. J. C. Dowd & Company.4 '
However, the term, relief, was accorded a slightly different
interpretation in the case of D.D.D. Corporation v. Federal Trade
Commission.8 The petitioner's patent medicine was advertised
for quick "relief" from itching which results from eczema,
blotches, pimples, athletes' foot, scales, rashes, and other ex-
ternally caused skin eruptions. The Commission found that the
preparation had no therapeutic value, and hence could not cure
internally caused itching; that the advertisement of a remedy
implied that it would relieve the condition from which the itch-
ing was caused; and that the addition of the clause "or other ex-
46. Id. at 166.
47. 178 Fed. 73, 75 (C.C.A. 2d, 1910).
48. 125 F.(2d) 679 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942).
[Vol. VI
COMMENTS
ternally caused skin eruptions" implied that those diseases pre-
viously enumerated were of external origin. The order prohibited
the respondent from advertising its product so as to convey the
meaning that the preparation would eitherpermanently or tem-
porarily eliminate the disease or the condition which gave rise to
the itching or that it had any therapeutic value other than as
affording temporary alleviation. The court directed that the word
"temporary" be deleted from the order. It stated that the phrase
"relief from itching" would not tend to induce the public to be-
lieve that the preparation was a cure for either the disease or the
symptoms. The distinction drawn between this and the Aroberg
case was entirely justifiable. In the principal case the immediate
concern of the patient would be the annoying symptoms, whereas
the basic disorder would doubtless be the immediate concern of
the patient under the facts of the Aronberg case. In the latter
case the court alluded to testimonials received by the petitioner
which thoroughly demonstrated that the purchasers of their
product so regarded the preparation in question.
Misleading advertisements may produce harmful results for
the general public even though such advertisements are not
directed toward the ultimate user. Untruthful claims made to
physicians and other medical practitioners will be suppressed in
appropriate cases. Although the licensed physician will likely
be more skeptical than the untutored public of extravagant
claims, yet his capacity to judge is not unlimited. Furthermore,
many licensed healers and practitioners lay no claim to superior
knowledge of medical therapy. Hence untruthful advertising
directed through this channel may properly be the object of a
cease and desist order.49
Use of Deceptive Brands and Names
The deceptive branding of products has been condemned with
little hesitation by the Federal Trade Commission. With respect
to this practice the orders of the Commission have received ex-
tensive judicial support. The fact that the offending brand name
has been allowed registration as a trade mark does not sanction
its use as an instrument of deception." The test of the petitioners'
conduct is not whether a trade mark may have been registered,
but whether-the method whereby it is used falls within the pro-
49. Irwin v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.(2d) 316 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944).




hibition of the Federal Trade Commission Act which forbids the
use of misleading trade marks.
The Stanley Laboratories had used the letters "M.D." in
advertising douche powder. The letters were employed in con-
junction with photographs of doctors and also preceding the trade
name of the product. Other advertising devices regularly used
by them were portrayals of uniformed nurses or the medical cross
symbol. All these were associated with statements to the effect
that the product was a recent development of scientific research
endorsed by leading physicians and surgeons. In addition, the
petitioner used terms such as "dependable safeguard." The Com-
mission found that these methods of advertising tended to deceive
the public into believing that the powder had been endorsed by
the medical profession or the American Red Cross as a contra-
ceptive or a germicide which would combat all forms of germ
life. The order, which was comprehensive in scope, was affirmed
in Stanton v. Federal Trade Commission.-
The freedom with which the Commission proceeds against
the more subtle deceptive practices of advertisers is illustrated
by the case of Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corporation v.
Federal Trade Commission.52 A cosmetic preparation commonly
known to the trade as a powder base for make-up was labeled
and advertised as "Charles of the Ritz Rejuvenescence Cream."
An extensive advertising campaign placed emphasis upon the
rejuvenating qualities of the product. A typical reference wasto
"a vital organic ingredient" which the product allegedly con-
tained. The makers claimed that the product "brings to the user's
skin quickly the clear radiance... the petal like quality and tex-
ture of youth, that it restores natural moisture necessary for a
live, healthy skin.., that it gives the skin a bloom which is won-
derfully rejuvenating and constantly active in keeping your skin
clear, radiant, and young looking."' '58
After a hearing the Commission found that such claims were
false, and that no treatment which will restore youth or the
appearance of youth to the skin regardless of the age of the user
is known to medical science. It therefore ordered that the peti-
tioner cease (1) disseminating in any advertisement of its prod-
uct the word "Rejuvenescence" or any other word of similar im-
port; (2) representing directly or by inference that the product
will rejuvenate the skin. The petitioner claimed that there was
51. 131 F.(2d) 105 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942).
52. 143 F.(2d) 676 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
53. Id. at 678.
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not sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the Commission
that the cream does not rejuvenate the skin. In support of this
it maintained that the formula of the preparation was secret
and not known to the Commission's experts. It further urged
that use of the term "Rejuvenescence" did not amount to a repre-
sentation that the product would restore the appearance of youth
ot the skin. "Rejuvenescence," it stated, was a nondescriptive
"boastful and fanciful word," utilized solely for its attractiveness
as a trade mark.
There was ample precedent for the court's rejection of the
petitioner's first contention. Since the decision in Coca-Cola
Company v. Wirthman Drug Company,54 it has been settled that
an advertiser is not privileged to stand upon its refusal to disclose
the true formula for its preparation as a trade secret. Further-
more the court had previously held that failure by the producer
to reveal facts within its immediate knowledge is a circumstance
which tends to confirm the Commission's charges.55
Dictionary definitions of "rejuvenescence" were resorted to
by the court to sustain the Commission's findings that the con-
notation of the brand name was untruthful and that the term
impliedly promises a restoration of youth. There was no positive
testimony.that either tradesmen or purchasers had attached any
narrower significance to the word.
Had the term, rejuvenescence, been applied to a lotion or
some other remedy for skin treatment there could scarcely be any
doubt as to the correctness of the decision. However its use in
connection with a powder base raises some doubt as to whether
the public would likely be deceived as claimed. As to the entire
tenor of the condemned advertising scheme, there were doubtless
false and misleading practices.
An interesting feature of this same case was the allusion to
unfair advertising practices by persons other than the petitioner
and the effect to be given the prevalency of these practices. It
54. 48 F.(2d) 743 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931), where a manufacturer charged a
dealer with unfair competition in diluting the former's product and selling
it as genuine; the manufacturer was held to have the burden of proof and
could not avoid producing evidence showing dilution of the product solely
because to do so would reveal its trade secret.
55. Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 1, 72 L.Ed.
137 (1927). This was a suit by the United States against the Mammoth Oil
Company of which Harry F. Sinclair was president (in connection with the
Tea Pot Dome Oil scandal) for the cancellation of leases on government
property illegally obtained. The government having made out a prima facie
case, the failure of Sinclair to testify when he could have offered all the




is common knowledge that the thinking of the average American
woman is conditioned by commentaries in magazines and over
the radio on vitamins, hormones, and similar miracles from the
cauldron of modern science. Hence the purchaser is peculiarly
susceptible to extravagant claims to renewable youth which
purport to rest on some newly discovered basis.
In this connection the court remarked:
"And, while the wise and worldly may well realize the falsity
of any representations that the present product can roll back
the years, there remains 'that vast multitude' of others who,
like Ponce de Leon, still seek a perpetual fountain of youth.
'8
In Dr. W. B. Caldwell, Incorporated v. Federal Trade Com-
mission,5 7 the Commission prohibited the use of the word "pepsin"
in the brand name "Dr. Caldwell's Syrup of Pepsin" where the
product did not contain pepsin in a sufficient quantity to serve as
a substantial therapeutic agent. The product's principal ingredi-
ents were senna and cascara sagrada. The respondent was ordered
to cease using any term or name which concealed or minimized
the presence of these two drugs as the active ingredients. Unani-
mous confirmation of the order was given by the court.
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act the
Commission may proceed against "unfair methods of competition"
occurring in interstate commerce, provided such proceedings are
"in the public interest." For some time it was doubtful whether
or not the existence of "public interest" was a jurisdictional limi-
tation or a mere statutory permit to enable the Commission to
ignore trivial complaints. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner5 8
was the first case definitely to treat this problem. It was there
held that the existence of public interest was a matter to be de-
termined by the court in each instance and which therefore af-
fected the jurisdiction of the Commission. Since the Klesner case,
there has been considerable speculation as to the extent of public
interest which must exist in order that the requisite jurisdiction
be conferred upon the Commission. In that same case the court
stated by way of dictum that misrepresentation, confusion, or
deception of the purchaser was not enough, particularly if the
confusion was of the type commonly known as "passing-off."
The court appeared to regard such a matter as a private contro-
56. Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
143 F.(2d) 676, 680 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
57. 111 F.(2d) 889 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
58. 280 U.S. 19, 50 S.Ct. 1, 74 L.Ed. 138 (1929).
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versy between the offender and the person whose trade mark or
trade name had been simulated. The recent case of Pep Boys-
Manny, Moe, and Jack, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission 9 indi-
cates a much more liberal attitude on the part of the courts than
was manifested in the Klesner case. The petitioners were distrib-
utors of radio apparatus, who, for the purpose of promoting sales,
adopted the popular name "Remington," which is in common
use by manufacturers of guns and typewriters. The cease and
desist order of the Commission directed against the use of this
confusing term was affirmed by the circuit *court of appeal. Al-
though the court did not repudiate the Klesner case nor assert
that the public interest question was not a jurisdictional matter,
it nevertheless indicated that an extensive unauthorized use of
a well-known trade name is properly within the cognizance of
the Commission. Thus the shackles of the Klesner case are being
gradually removed.
In Bockensette v. Federal Trade Commission0 petitioners
advertised that their chicks were "R.O.P. Stock." This is an
abbreviation of United States Record of Performance and repre-
sents a nation-wide'plan for the improvement of poultry produced
in hatcheries. Members are called R.O.P. Operators, and chickens
brooded by them under its rules and regulations are called
R.O.P. Stock. Since the petitioner was not a participating mem-
ber, his advertising practice was regarded by the Commission
as misbranding, and this order was affirmed by the court.
Another obesity case is Stanton v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion.A' Petitioner's product was advertised as "Anti-Fat Tablets."
Finding that the tablets had no therapeutic value in the treat-
ment of obesity, the Commission ordered the petitioner to cease
using this brand or in any other manner indicating that her prod-
uct was a remedy or cure for obesity. This order was affirmed.
Fictitious Price Reductions and Related Devices
Various advertising and merchandising schemes are currently
employed to create the false impression that the prospective pur-
chaser is being offered an opportunity to make a purchase under
unusually favorable conditions. The most prevalent of these,
perhaps, is the lottery device, which appeals to the urge to get
something for nothing.
Since the decision in the well known case, Fediral Trade
59. 122 F.(2d) 158 (C.C.A. 3d, 1941).
60. 134 F.(2d) 369 (C.C.A. 10th, 1943).
61. 131 F.(2d) 105 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942).
1945]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Brother6 2 the jurisdiction of the
Commission to prohibit merchandising through lottery devices
has been unquestioned. Recent cases deal chiefly with the ques-
tion as to how close must be the relationship between the defen-
dant's activities and the outlawed lottery practices. Most of the
controversies involve confectionaries. The sale of candy which
is so manufactured or packaged as to be peculiarly adapted to
disposition by lottery at retail has been recognized as an unfair
practice. 8 Of course the order must be so framed' as not to pro-
hibit the sale of "straight candy" 4 or candy which, although sus-
ceptible to chance sale, shows no peculiar adaptability to that
purpose.25 The practices which have been condemned include
the preparation and packaging of candies so that an occasional
piece has a center different in color from the rest, 6 or in the sale
of punch boards, either in conjunction with the sale of candy or
separately.6 7 In such instances it is no defense that the active
conduct of the lottery is not carried on by the defendant.
Neither can it successfully be claimed that candy sold on a
chance basis is not in active competition with similar products
which are not so sold, despite the fact that the purchasers of
"chance" candy are not necessarily the same group who regularly
purchase straight goods.69
In 1935 Bunte Brothers, Incorporated, an Illinois manufac-
turer sold to dealers in that state an assortment of candy adapted
to the lottery sale device. The Federal Trade Commission issued
a cease and desist order despite the absence of any showing of
interstate sales. Its theory was that the practice enabled Bunte
Brothers to compete unfairly with the manufacturers outside the
state, who were subject to orders of the Commission prohibiting
lottery sales. This theory was rejected by the circuit court,70
62. 291 U.S. 304, 54 S.Ct. 423, 78 L.Ed. 814 (1934).
63. National Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 104 F.(2d) 999
(C.C.A. 7th, 1939); Hill v. Federal Trade Commission, 124 F.(2d) 104 (C.C.A.
5th, 1941).
64. Ostler Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 F.(2d) 962
(C.C.A. 10th, 1939).
65. Sweets Co. of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 109 F.(2d)
296 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940).
66. National Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 104 F.(2d) 999
(C.C.A. 7th, 1939).
67. Ostler Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 F.(2d) 962 (C.C.A.
10th, 1939); Hill v. Federal Trade Commission, 124 F.(2d) 104 (C.C.A. 5th
1941).
68. Hill v. Federal Trade Commission, 124 F.(2d) 104 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941).
69. Ostler Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 F.(2d) 962 (C.C.A.
10th, 1939).




which ruled that the act does not authorize a proceeding against
an intrastate practice on the ground that interstate trade would
thereby be affected. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling,
although Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson filed a vigorous
dissent.
Had the theory of the Commission prevailed, virtually all
trade practices everywhere would be subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission, since it is difficult to conceive of a market
where many of the competitors are not engaged in interstate
commerce. The area and scope of activities to be affected would
thus be broadened immensely, and it is doubtful that the Com-
mission is equipped to cope with the enlarged duties which would
be imposed upon it. In this respect the situation differs materially
from the picture presented in the Shreveport case 1 which was
heavily relied upon by the minority. The majority opinion made
clear the fact that the Court would sustain the power of Congress
to enlarge the activities of the Commission to the extent con-
tended for, but that it would await clear legislative action and
would not act upon implication alone.
Another frequently used fictitious price reduction device is
the use of "free goods" to create the false impression that some-
thing is being thrown in without charge, when, as a matter of fact,
the cost of the so-called gratuity is fully covered by the amount
exacted in the transaction as a whole. In International Art Com-
pany v. Federal Trade CommissionJ2 the court sustained an order
of the Commission directed against the practice of representing
that purchasers would receive hand-painted pictures at a greatly
reduced price, and the use of a drawing system through which
the purchaser was misled into believing that he received a free
picture with each purchase. Actually the products were simply
enlarged photographs which were disposed of at an exorbitant
price. A discount company, ostensibly operated to refinance the
unpaid balance of the purchase price, but amply shown by the
facts to be a part of the same concern operated to forestall any
claim made by a customer who had been a victim of the fraudu-
lent sales plan by pleading itself an innocent purchaser of the
account for value, was included under the terms of the order.
An order was issued in Thomas Quilt Factory v. Federal
Trade Commission73 against the petitioner's falsely advertising
71. Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct.
833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914).
72. 116 F.(2d) 347 (C.C.A. 10th, 1940).
73. 109 F.(2d) 393 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
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that his feather quilts were being sold at one-half the usual price,
whereas the price quoted in the advertisement was the custo-
mary price charged. The so-called "sales price" in the plan con-
stituted the means by which virtually all the petitioner's quilts
were sold.
Misrepresentation of Competitor's Product
In Moretrench v. Federal Trade Commission7 the order in-
cluded a prohibition against advertised claims that the petition-
er's drilling equipment prevented backwash of jetted water
forced through the wellpoint, whereas competing products
failed to contain such a device. That portion of the order which
required the exclusion of this statement was modified by the
court so as to permit the petitioner to claim this merit for its
own product; but the requirement of the order excluding claims
that competing machines were not similarly equipped was af-
firmed.
An order was issued against a manufacturer of stainless steel
cooking utensils ordering it to cease disparaging competitors'
products by falsely representing that food cooked in aluminum
utensils was dangerous to health and would cause ulcers, cancers,
and other diseases. This order was affirmed."r The petitioner
sought a dismissal of the order by alleging that it had made efforts
to stop the defamation in question. It was pointed out by the
court, however, that these efforts began after the petition was
filed, and that there was no showing that they had met with suc-
cess. Even assuming that they had been successful, this would
not render the controversy moot, for there could be no assurance
that the slander would not be subsequently resumed. The court
said: "The order in no wise injures the petitioner and will be
an effective aid to it in its efforts to put a stop to the unfair prac-
tices."76
E. B. Muller & Company v. Federal Trade Commission77 was
a case in which the order of the Commission forbade the dis-
paragement of a competitor's product by false statements that the
latter contained molasses, sugar beet, and other foreign sub-
stances. The order also included a prohibition against represen-
74. 127 F.(2d) 792 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
75. Perma-Maid Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 121 F.(2d) 282
(C.C.A. 6th, 1941).
76. Id. at 285. A similar procedure is followed by courts with reference
to the issuance of injunctions against unfair competition where the defen-
dant alleges cessation after notice or institution of suit. Cf. Bass, Ratcliff
& Gretton, Ltd. v. Guggenheimer, 69 Fed. 271 (C.C.A. Md. 1895).
77. 142 F.(2d) 511 (C.CA, 6th, 1944),
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tations that the desirable and uniform coloring contained in
petitioners' products was the result of superior methods of roast-
ing, painstaking process of selection, and sorting, when in reality
the coloration was produced artificially by iron oxide. Unani-
mous approval of the order was given by the court.
Another disparagement situation is raised in International
Parts Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission.-8 A manufac-
turer of mufflers was ordered to desist from stating that com-
peting mufflers with stop-welded seams were inferior to its own
product or that the use of such competing devices results in
danger of carbon monoxide poisoning. This order was set aside
by the court on the ground that there was no evidence to support
the Commission's finding of untruthfulness. The testimony of
the only witness produced was contrary to the finding of the
Commission.
HORACE G. PEPPER
NECESSITY FOR A BILL OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE OVER-
RULING OF A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
In criminal practice there is a generally accepted rule that a
bill of exceptions must be taken to every adverse ruling of the
trial judge, a rule which has been carried to the extent of requir-
ing a bill of exceptions to the overruling of a motion for a new
trial. It is the purpose of this article to point out that such an
extension carries the rule further than is warranted by the rele-
vant articles of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. It is
the further purpose of this article to indicate a possible solution
to what now constitutes a rather perplexing dilemma.
For a proper understanding of the problem, a brief study of
the history of bills of exception is in order. "Bills of exception
in criminal cases in this state are not of statutory origin. As they
were unknown at common law, which did not allow an appeal in
criminal cases, they were not adopted into our system by the act
of 1805, which adopted the body of common-law procedure in
criminal cases .... They are the growth of jurisprudence, and
prior to the adoption of Act No. 113 of 1896, p. 162, were wholly
dependent upon jurisprudence .... ,,1 Reference to the earlier
78. 133 F.(2d) 883 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
1. State v. Stockett, 115 La. 743, 744, 39 So. 1000 (1905).
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